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Misgendering and Its Moral Contestability
STEPHANIE JULIA KAPUSTA
In this article, I consider the harms inflicted upon transgender persons through “misgender-
ing,” that is, such deployments of gender terms that diminish transgender persons’ self-
respect, limit the discursive resources at their disposal to define their own gender, and cause
them microaggressive psychological harms. Such deployments are morally contestable, that is,
they can be challenged on ethical or political grounds. Two characterizations of “woman”
proposed in the feminist literature are critiqued from this perspective. When we consider what
would happen to transgender women upon the broad implementation of these characteriza-
tions within transgender women’s social context, we discover that they suffer from two
defects: they either exclude at least some transgender women, or else they implicitly foster
hierarchies among women, marginalizing transgender women in particular. In conclusion, I
claim that the moral contestability of gender-term deployments acts as a stimulus to regularly
consider the provisionality and revisability of our deployments of the term “woman.”
In this article I undertake an analysis of the harmful, oppressive, and contestable
practice that I call “misgendering.” The focus will be on transgender women, and I
take misgendering to mean something broader than simply the use of male pronouns,
or of designations associated with being male or with masculinity in referring to
transgender women. Here, the notion includes the use of gender terms that exclude
transgender women from the category woman,1 or that hierarchize that category in a
way that marginalizes transgender women.2 One of my main contentions is that
oppressive or harmful deployments of gender terms are subject to ethically or politi-
cally grounded challenges—that is, are morally contestable—irrespective of the com-
petencies, epistemic or linguistic, of those who deploy them. In particular, I present a
more detailed critique of two feminist conceptions of women that misgender
transgender women.
Transgender persons, as well as those who do not conform to societal expectations
around gendered linguistic usage, appearance, and behaviors, are discriminated against
and marginalized (Shelley 2008; Beemyn and Rankin 2011).3 I consider gender con-
ceptions and gender terms from the point of view of the transgender (or trans)
community, with a view to revealing how transgender persons are subject to a lin-
guistic form of moral harm and political oppression. I do not justify this methodologi-
cal stance in this article. The approach is, I hope, familiar within feminist theory
(Hartsock 2003; Haslanger 2012a, 24), and is aptly characterized by Miranda Fricker:
“Let us suppose our methodological injunction to be as follows: Whatever you want
to understand, try taking a look at it from the point of view of the powerless, those
on the losing end of the practice you want to explain” (Fricker 2012, 289). Socially
and politically dominant gender categorizations have a real effect on human lives,
with transgender people often on the “losing end” of the practice. Adopting the
transgender standpoint allows me to develop certain insights about gender-based
oppression that are not available and are not even considered by cisgender, that is,
nontransgender, feminist theory.
Yet that is not all that is to be said about the methodological perspective I am
adopting. Although trans men and other gender-nonconforming persons may be sub-
ject to the harms of misgendering, my focus here is on transgender women. More-
over, in several sections of this article, I circumscribe the transgender standpoint
further to adopt the point of view of the non-passing transgender woman. In essence,
I look within the community of transgender women, and within that community,
attempt to pick out a group that is marginalized and discriminated against, perhaps
even within that community (Hardie 2006). Being able to pass as a cisgender woman
is a type of privilege, and should be viewed as such. In short, the position of the
non-passing transgender woman is a kind of sequentially nested standpoint: within a
given oppressed group (transgender persons), I focus on the group who call them-
selves or self-identify in some way as women. Then within that group, I focus on
members of a sub-group that is subject to hierarchical marginalization, who are
regarded—sometimes within their own community—as “lesser” women.4 I do so
because it is critically incisive in cases of some uses of the term “woman” to adopt
the point of view of transgender minorities-within-minorities, moving as far as practi-
cally possible toward the social margins of group membership and identity.5 This lat-
ter view will become particularly salient when I discuss family-resemblance accounts
of the category woman in section 3.2.
In the next section I list and describe the principal harms that arise for trans-
gender persons from misgendering. In section 2, I then distinguish and describe
extensional and intensional approaches to gender terminology. I argue that both
approaches can fail to capture the moral and political claims a transgender woman
might have with respect to gender-term deployments. In section 3 I describe in
more detail the idea that gender-term deployments can be morally contestable, and
develop guidelines for detecting when this might be the case. I proceed to apply
the guidelines, along with a suitably developed criterion of (un)acceptability, to
some uses and meanings ascribed to the term “woman” in feminist philosophy
literature. I conclude by voicing a concern about my approach, and with a more
general observation about feminist theorizing in relation to transgender and gender-
nonconforming minorities.
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1. THE HARMS OF MISGENDERING
Misgendering can cause psychological harm, moral wrongs, and political disadvantage.
Let me briefly explain what I mean by these three types of harm, as the assumption
of their existence is crucial for what follows. I will summarily refer to these harms
with terms such as “moral harms,” “political oppression,” and so on. I will assume
that misgendering causes one or more of the following harms:
1.1. PSYCHOLOGICAL HARMS: MICROAGGRESSIONS
A microaggression is characterized as follows: “Microaggressions are the everyday ver-
bal, nonverbal, and environmental slights, snubs, or insults, whether intentional or
unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative messages to target
persons based solely upon their marginalized group membership” (Sue 2010, 3).
Transgender persons are subject to microaggressions (Nordmarken 2014; Nordmarken
and Kelly 2014).6 Research indicates that microaggressions “may on the surface
appear quite harmless, trivial, or be described as ‘small slights,’” but “have a powerful
impact upon the psychological well-being of marginalized groups” (Sue 2010, 3).
Those subject to them may suffer from chronic health problems, persistent anxiety,
fatigue, stress, hypervigilance, anger, fear, depression, shame, and a sense of loneli-
ness. The harm of micro-aggressive misgendering in relation to transgender people is
commonplace in many different contexts of social interaction (Nordmarken 2014,
130; Nordmarken and Kelly 2014, 150–51).
1.2. MORAL HARMS: EPISTEMIC INJUSTICES AND THE UNDERMINING OF SELF-RESPECT
Transgender persons are denied the discursive resources to participate in furthering
society’s understanding of their own gender and—I would add—of gender more gen-
erally. By being persistently classified as a “man” according to particular conceptions
and descriptions, a transgender woman is denied participation in shaping those
descriptions herself. This is an instance of what Fricker calls hermeneutical marginal-
ization. Fricker proceeds to define hermeneutical injustice as “the injustice of having
some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understand-
ing owing to hermeneutical marginalization” (Fricker 2006, 102).
The primary harm that emerges from hermeneutical injustice, according to
Fricker, is a situated hermeneutical inequality, that is, “the concrete situation. . . such
that the subject is rendered unable to make communicatively intelligible something
which it is particularly in his or her interests to be able to render intelligible”
(Fricker 2006, 103). This harm may be tied to an imposed, “authoritative” interpreta-
tion of the subject’s experience that constitutes her social identity. At the very least,
it contributes to robbing transgender women of the power to express their own senses
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of self, and of the opportunity to develop a language and conceptual resources that
articulate those senses of self.
Besides injustices of an epistemic nature, misgendering undermines self-respect. By
this I mean the worth a person recognizes in her own agency and her own life plans,
inasmuch as they are her own (Rawls 1999, 286). Without self-respect, action itself
is impeded. This kind of self-respect—distinguished from the self-evaluation involved
in self-esteem—can be “undermined by the words or actions of others” (Brake 2013,
66). Because a person’s gender identity can be part of her life struggle, and one of
the most central values of who she is, misgendering—especially when persistent—can
lead to an erosion of a transgender person’s plans to lead the life she wishes to lead,
indeed, to an erosion of pursuing any of her own plans for life.
1.3. POLITICAL HARMS: OPPRESSION AND DOMINATION
If definitions of who a transgender woman is misgender her, so that she is a “man” in
the eyes of the law and of the state, then she will be subject to additional burdens
and discrimination to which citizens should not be subject, and she may have limited
access to goods and services. For example, if a transgender woman cannot legally
change the gender marker from “male” to “female” on her driver’s license or her
identity card due to legal definitions or administrative interpretations of those terms,
she becomes exposed to possible abuse and discrimination, along with the continual
burden of explaining herself to medical insurance representatives, police officers, and
sundry officials. She may also face discrimination at work and in finding accommoda-
tion. Following Iris Marion Young, such political and administrative effects are exam-
ples of oppression understood as “the institutional constraint on self-development,”
as well as domination, “the institutional constraint on self-determination” (Young
2011, 37).
2. INTENSIONAL AND EXTENSIONAL APPROACHES TO GENDER-TERM DEPLOYMENTS
Imagine Laura. Laura is a transgender woman, say around fifty-five years old. She
became increasingly unhappy and struggled emotionally for many years with her gen-
der identity, concerned that a decision to transition would ruin her marriage and
destroy her family. Because of high blood pressure and diabetes, her doctors have
advised against sex reassignment surgery. She takes hormones but—perhaps due to
the fact that she is a “late transitioner”—they do not seem to have much of a femi-
nizing effect on her appearance. She wears female attire and sometimes make-up, but
has the physical stature, facial features, and voice that would usually be perceived by
most as typically “masculine.” In short, Laura does not “pass” as a woman in most
social contexts. Laura will be taken as a hypothetical test-case throughout the
analyses that follow. She is a fictional character, but not very different from several
transgender persons I know.
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Can Laura be included in the category woman? To answer this question, we can
plausibly adopt two approaches: the first begins with the intension or connotation of
the term “woman”; the second takes the extension or denotation (referents) of the
term as its starting point. This dual nature of linguistic terms, variously called “com-
prehension” and “denotation,” “connotation” and “denotation,” “sense” and “refer-
ence,” points at a dichotomy between “what a term means and what it denotes”
(Fitting 2015). The meaning, sense, or connotation of the term will usually consist of
a group of propositions, a description, that individuals must satisfy in order for the
term to apply to them. I will call this the intensional approach to the term
“woman.”7 Alternatively, one can start with the referents of the term, that is, propose
an ostensive definition. I will call this an extensional approach to the term
“woman.”8 When one asks whether the term “woman” applies to Laura or not, both
approaches are, in principle, possible. More specifically, it seems intuitive that one
might consider the following ways to determine whether Laura is a woman. One
might ask,
1. Are there some biological, social, or psychological facts that establish that Laura
is a woman? Laura is a woman if she satisfies the relevant propositions that
enter some proposed description (compare Mallon 2006, 530–31). The approach
is intensional.
2. Is Laura, in general and for the most part, called a “woman” by the competent
users of the English language who encounter her? This is a question about the
referents of the term “woman” according to a standard of linguistic use. The
definition of “woman” is not descriptive but ostensive, and the approach is
extensional.
Let us say that the use of a gender term to refer to individuals, or the description
associated with a gender term, is a gender-term deployment. In the former case, the
deployment will be called extensional; in the latter, it is intensional. With these dis-
tinctions in mind, let us look, in turn, at intensional and extensional deployments of
“woman” with respect to Laura.
2.1. INTENSIONAL DEPLOYMENTS OF “WOMAN”
We can determine whether Laura satisfies an anatomical description associated with
the term “woman” by observing her body. In case of uncertainty or dispute—for
example, if she is intersex—we defer to medical experts with specialist knowledge of
human physiology, and decide the question according to their more detailed and
refined descriptions.9 Second, we can determine whether Laura satisfies a social
description associated with the term “woman” by observing the social facts about
Laura in an analogous way: social position, and social behaviors and attitudes, for
example. In case of doubt—for example, in case some of her social positions or social
behaviors are difficult to interpret—we would again defer to experts: to sociologists,
anthropologists, or social psychologists perhaps, who possess a more refined and better
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informed description. Further, Laura might also satisfy a psychological description
associated with “woman.” Yet we might worry that Laura’s internal sense of gender is
not transparent to herself, or that she has some sort of mental illness, in which case
we would defer to the opinion of a psychiatrist or psychologist. Again, it is usually
assumed that these experts possess a more sophisticated, scientifically grounded
description of psychological states that Laura would need to satisfy to be called a
“woman.”
2.1.1. Problems with Deference to Expert Opinion
So much seems intuitively plausible. But let us ask some questions about all these
descriptions. Some theories of meaning point out that our conceptual content or inten-
sions are often inadequate. For example, semantic externalism—the view that concep-
tual content is individuated at least partly through our relations to the environment
(Haslanger 2012c, 373–75)—claims that the descriptions Laura is taken to need to sat-
isfy—even those of experts—may be incomplete or erroneous. This is why Tyler Burge
introduces the distinction between concepts and conceptions, a distinction that cap-
tures the idea that language users can talk and think about something using the concept
of some x, but their articulation of how they understand x, their conception of x, may
be incomplete or erroneous. Examples from the history of science support the view that
concepts or “translational meanings” may remain the same, while conceptions or “lexi-
cal meanings” can change (Burge 1986, 716; 1993, 316–17). A term—such as “atom,”
for example—picks out what we are talking about, despite the imperfections or incom-
pleteness in the way we explicate it as our science advances.
We can thus conclude from the possible “disjunct” between conceptions and con-
cepts that expert opinions may themselves be incomplete, and may even be mis-
guided. Nevertheless, one might claim that deference to experts as regards the
meanings of technical terms or terms of art is still normatively appropriate (Williams
1990, 454–55). After all, in the case in which “woman” is understood as a term of
art, experts’ conceptions, even though incomplete and subject to revision, are still
more adequate than the conceptions articulated by laypeople.
The situation is more complicated with categories regarding gender and sexuality,
and this poses problems for the normativity of deferential attitudes where socially and
politically important conceptions and terms are at stake. Where expert terms inflict psy-
chological harm or are oppressive, deference to those regarded as experts is inappropri-
ate. For example, many psychiatrists once declared that homosexuality was a mental
disorder; that is, they defended a certain pathologizing and denigrating conception of
homosexuals. It is when homosexuals themselves got to contest the expert conceptions,
and began to mobilize with others around the issue, that change became possible: homo-
sexuality was ultimately removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association. We can consider another example, more relevant to Laura’s
situation. Until recently, the DSM still categorized transgender persons under a condi-
tion called GID—Gender Identity Disorder. The underlying psychiatric conception of
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gender assumed that a person’s subjective sense of gender should align with physical
sex. Again, it was when experts began to take into account the experiences, testimonies,
and criticisms of transgender persons and their organizations that GID was renamed
“Gender Dysphoria” in DSM-V, with revised diagnostic criteria (American Psychiatric
Association 2013).10 Moreover, with human social kinds we often find “looping effects”
(Hacking 1995; 1999; Haslanger 2012b, 465–67): those falling under the expert concep-
tion can come to influence its content. Such effects may occur without the full aware-
ness of those who interact in shaping conceptions—what one might call “interactive
conceptual drift.” What I am suggesting is that a more consciously political and con-
certed influence upon expert conceptions on the part of those classified by them does
happen and does effect change. This politically mobilized influence—although it can be
to some degree informed by scientifically based critiques—need not be primarily scien-
tific in nature, and can be exerted by laypeople. The point is that its claim is largely eth-
ical or political. Deferring to expert opinion in such cases is not obligatory. On the
contrary, contesting such opinion can be ethically recommended.
2.1.2. What about “Natural-Kind Terms”?
I claim, then, that deference to expert opinion when expert conceptions of gender
are politically oppressive or morally denigrating is unjustified, and can reinforce nega-
tive social attitudes toward gender and sexual minorities. Now, someone might con-
cede what I have claimed so far, as long as we treat the expert conceptions of
“woman” as limited to a description of social position or subjective psychological
states. Yet they may claim that—if “woman” is used as a natural-kind term—my
argument is unsound. They may say:
I admit that the gender conceptions of psychiatrists and social scientists
are interactive kinds, and more prone to sexist and cissexist bias. And I
concede that they are contestable, not just within the scientific commu-
nity for reasons that are epistemic, but also within the broader commu-
nity, in which the reasons for contest are moral and political. This
certainly problematizes, within an intensional approach, the proposed pro-
cedures to find answers to the questions concerning whether Laura is a
woman. But, surely, it is hardly contestable that Laura possesses male geni-
talia, and so is a man—at least in some contexts—so that one can answer
the question about whether Laura is a woman in the negative.
To answer the objection, I adopt and adapt some considerations from Jennifer Saul
(2012). As she has pointed out, there is something wrong even in this case. One
might claim, for example, that for the purposes of an examination for prostate cancer,
Laura is a man, that is, she is a man in the context of “testing-for-prostate-cancer.”
The public health service in her country may issue advice that men forty years of age
and over should have their prostates periodically tested. When she goes for such an
examination, the doctor may well call her a “man” and use the pronoun “he,”
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because he believes Laura satisfies a certain description of what it is to be called a
“man” (his approach is intensional). But she will find this use of language offensive
and denigrating. Saul notes:
Disagreements over who counts as a woman are simply not to be settled
by appeal to the facts of language. They are to be settled by appeal to
moral and political principles. There may well be a single right answer
about what standards should be applied for determining who satisfies the
definition of “woman” in a particular context; but it will be right because
it is morally and politically right. (Saul 2012, 204)
Let us look more closely at Saul’s idea. Even limited to this particular context, by
calling Laura a “man,” the doctor not only offends her, but he disvalues her personal
struggle of resistance to oppressive gender norms and to society’s prejudice. It is true
that Laura and the doctor have different conceptions of the categories man and
woman, possibly with diverging associated descriptions. The doctor, presumably, is the
“expert” in medicine: Laura is not his epistemic peer in this respect. Yet this is not
simply a case of epistemic disagreement, but also of ethical disagreement. Laura, in
contesting the use of that term to designate her own person, is making an ethical
claim, not necessarily a factual claim about her body. It is of moral significance that
she be able to contest the doctor’s use.11 There is no “deference condition” as there
usually might be when laypeople employ terms of expertise, that is, there is no inten-
tion on the part of Laura to use the term “woman” as (medical) experts use it. This
is because being a woman for Laura is part of what Talia Mae Bettcher calls “existen-
tial self-identity.” For her, the avowal “I am a woman” does not invoke the factual
question “What am I, biologically?” but rather involves “the importance of one’s per-
sonal history of relatedness to gender, body, and sex. It will also probably involve the
significance of the question ‘What does it mean for me to be a woman?’ to one’s
interpretation of one’s past and one’s projects for the future” (Bettcher 2009, 112).
There is much more at stake for Laura than there is for the doctor when he uses
the term “man” to refer to her: she may experience triggering effects of various sorts,
painful memories of rejection, all of this allied to the undermining of her personal
identity, as well as a threat to her self-respect. I claim that Laura’s objection to the
doctor: “Don’t call me a man,” is not an objection to expert language use as such,
but to the denigration of who she regards herself to be, and the denial of her moral
claim to be that person.
Given Laura’s input into a dispute over whether she should be called a “man,” the
doctor’s stance should be conciliatory: he ought to come to realize that the employ-
ment of “man,” “male,” “masculine,” or “he” is much more than a designation of body
parts, and is particularly so for Laura. Once the meaning of purportedly natural-kind
terms flows over into the ethical, changes in terminology are called for. The doctor
should choose to address Laura, and to discuss her case, in other terms. According to
his medical knowledge, the meaning of “man” includes possession of a prostate. How-
ever, he encounters Laura’s first-person ethical authority that, in this case, overrides
his own use of gender terms.
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2.2. THE EXTENSIONAL APPROACH TO “WOMAN”
Laura’s visit to the doctor has already touched on normative language use. Linguistic
normativity is also relevant to asking competent users of the English language
whether they would call Laura a “woman.” In this case, it is the extension of
“woman” that is at stake. We appeal to the authority of the relevant linguistic com-
munity. But which community might that be? Who are the competent users? Whose
use is authoritative? Let us say that Laura is active in a local transgender support
group. Within that group—as would be the case in many other similar groups—even
when Laura presents in a more “masculine” way, she is unproblematically called
“woman” and referred to with the pronoun “she” (Bettcher 2013, 240–41). Yet the
members of these support groups are all competent users of the English language. In
effect, nonconforming use presupposes “being in the know” of how terms are predom-
inantly used (Williams 1990, 455).
Here, a possible dispute about the extension of the term “woman” is thus not
decided by questions of linguistic competence, since Laura and her transgender sup-
port group are as linguistically competent as anyone else. Perhaps, then, we should
simply follow the prevalent or majoritarian use? But it is morally problematic to
claim that the transgender use of the term “woman” is incorrect or deviant, for it will
be “incorrect” only with respect to a common and “natural” use that is a mechanism
for diminishing Laura’s self-respect and denying her basic rights. One of the justifica-
tions of the “common-sense” use would be that transgender persons are using the
word “woman” incorrectly, and that they are simply in error, either deluding them-
selves or deceiving others (Bettcher 2007). Majoritarian use is susceptible to prejudice
and bias. It can be a tool to maintain asymmetries of social power, a tyranny of
the (linguistic) majority. Once again, ethical or political norms problematize the
application of linguistic norms.
3. GENDER-TERM DEPLOYMENTS WITHIN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY
I have so far argued that oppressive or harmful deployments of gender terms are sub-
ject to ethically or politically grounded challenges, irrespective of the competencies,
epistemic or linguistic, of those who deploy them. I have, in particular, argued for
this claim by considering the misgendering of transgender women. I now wish to
move away from everyday, personal, and institutional misgendering of Laura and
others like her, and consider gender-term deployments within feminist philosophy. In
my analysis I consider two forms of misgendering that are unacceptable with regard
to transgender women like Laura: first, exclusion from membership in a gender cate-
gory woman, and, second, marginalization, that is, location at a lower level of hierar-
chy or graded structure within the category woman, or location at its margins.
Now, unless Laura has a particular interest in philosophy, she is unlikely to
encounter such deployments in her daily life, and it is safe to say that the psychologi-
cal or moral harms and political oppression she does face on a daily basis are not of a
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theoretically refined, academic kind. So, in talking of misgendering, how am I justi-
fied in making the move from a common, everyday type of gender-term deployment
to a gender-term deployment within philosophy?
My claim is not that the philosophical accounts of gender that follow are actually
oppressive or morally harmful. What I am claiming is that a criterion for deciding
their acceptability resides in seeing what would happen to people like Laura if philo-
sophical gender-term deployments were broadly applied at the social and political
levels. Acceptable theorizing has a moral or political basis. We can ask about exclu-
sion and marginalization, because of how gender-term deployments would affect Laura
if broadly deployed within her social environment. The criterion for unacceptability
is expressed counterfactually:
Let x be a philosophical deployment of the gender term “woman.” Then x
is unacceptable from a transgender standpoint if x would be an oppressive
or harmful gender-term deployment with respect to some group of trans-
gender women when implemented (broadly applied) within society.
By “implementation” I mean common acceptance of a particular understanding or
usage of a gender term within the social environment, or the application of that
usage or meaning in law or government policy. The counterfactual criterion for unac-
ceptability is relative to a transgender point of view. I do not exclude the possibility
that, for some purpose or other, the deployments I critique may be adequate. Neither
do I state “from the transgender point of view,” as there are many transgender points
of view. For example, certain deployments of “woman” within the philosophical liter-
ature that would be harmful or oppressive to some transgender women when broadly
implemented, may not be so for genderqueer trans people. Further, my characteriza-
tion of the criterion presupposes some knowledge of how transgender women actually
live within society, which reveals the potential harms of gender-term deployments.
Finally, if gender-term deployments are unacceptable, upon broad implementation
they would be morally contestable in the sense explained earlier: Laura or others
would possess justified ethical or political reasons to challenge them.
With our counterfactual unacceptability criterion in hand, we can now proceed to
consider some philosophical deployments of the term “woman,” and see what would
happen if they were socially or politically implemented within Laura’s social context.
3.1. EXCLUSION: ALCOFF’S INTENSIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF “WOMAN”
In her account of what it is to be a woman, Linda Alcoff is concerned to maintain
the material, “objective basis” for sexed identity. She proposes that women are differ-
entiated from men by a specific “relationship of possibility to biological reproduction,
with biological reproduction referring to conceiving, giving birth, and breast-feeding,
involving one’s own body” (Alcoff 2006, 172). The possibilities Alcoff is discussing
refer to “practices, expectations, and feelings with regard to reproduction” irrespective
of their actuality, so that, for example, infertile women, postmenopausal women, as
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well as prepubescent girls are included. The particular functions of biological repro-
duction thus configure females’ interpretive horizons because of “the ways in which
we are embodied” (176).
The prospects that Laura will be called a “woman” on Alcoff’s account are rather
poor, but perhaps not completely hopeless. Maybe Laura has always wanted to con-
ceive, give birth, and breast-feed, even as she was fully aware that such things were
physically impossible for her. Thus, it would seem that—on Alcoff’s account—she is
very close to some infertile cisgender females. However, one could conceive of males
who have wanted to give birth, but who—unlike Laura—are perfectly happy to be
men within society. Perhaps Alcoff’s insistence that the relationship of possibility
involve one’s own body, or the ways in which females are embodied, takes us toward
an interpretation that is meant to rule out such cases.
Alcoff associates the possibility of pregnancy, childbirth, nursing, and rape with
females’ horizons that are carried “throughout childhood and much or all of our adult
lives.” She is thereby also invoking a notion of female socialization, linked to expec-
tations and practices around female reproduction, centered on the embodiment of
the person involved. We should conclude that because Laura has a male embodi-
ment, this type of biology-constrained socialization is not hers. One could perhaps
suitably modify and clarify Alcoff’s description of satisfaction criteria for being a
woman but, as it stands, her intensional deployment of “woman” will exclude Laura.
If broadly implemented in Laura’s context, Alcoff’s intensional deployment would jus-
tify continued misgendering of at least some transgender women, causing psychologi-
cal, moral, and political harm. Such considerations reveal that Alcoff’s gender-term
deployment is unacceptable from a transgender perspective.12
Why does Alcoff place so much emphasis on features of reproductive function?
Much feminist theorizing and activism has centered on reproductive rights. Authors
such as Alcoff wish to ground their theories in the material embodiment (“material
content” [Alcoff 2006, 174]) characterized by gestation, lactation, menstruation, and
the like, as well as the experiences of social life that ensue. Alcoff states:
The significance of the division of labor in the process of biological repro-
duction is not unstable or undecidable all the way down. There is much
that is variable about it, and social conditions can make pregnancy a true
disability, but it will never have the range of variable significance that eye
color, skin color, or height can have. Its objective significance is trans-
formable only by technology. To categorize human beings on the basis of
a biological division of labor is thus to recognize an objective type. (Alcoff
2006, 175)
In the face of concerns that my approach simply ignores the biological materiality of
reproductive function, let me stress that I do not dispute that the division of repro-
ductive labor has been significant in analyzing “women’s” oppression in the past, and
will continue to be so in many contexts. It is certainly important to recognize specific
biological facts that ground vulnerability and exploitation. However, the crucial ques-
tion from a transgender perspective is whether the biological differences ought to be
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the basis for labeling people as “woman” and “man” in an exclusive, exhaustive way,
that is, in all possible contexts, including Laura’s social context. And one can ask, as
I do, what harms might emerge for trans people by doing so. Additionally, there are
now people claiming to be “men” (transgender men) who give birth. Reproductive
rights then cease to straightforwardly be a “women’s issue.” The question is thus not
one concerning the biological facts of the matter, but one that regards finding a ter-
minology that inflicts no psychological, moral, or political harms on marginalized
individuals.
3.2. INTENSIONALLY DEPLOYED GRADABILITY: EXCLUSION AND MARGINALIZATION
Gradability and rankings emerge in the case of family-resemblance approaches to
intensional deployments of “woman.” Here, the “nonpassability” and physical features
of transgender women like Laura become particularly salient, since the accounts
ostensibly rely on resemblance, and nonpassing, nonoperative transgender women like
Laura will presumably exhibit very little resemblance to paradigmatic members of the
category woman. Indeed, they may possess greater “resemblances” to paradigmatic
members of the contrast category man.
Several authors have proposed family-resemblance accounts of the concept of
woman (Stoljar 1995; Hale 1996/2006; Cressida Heyes 2000; Lindemann Nelson
2002; Frye 2011; Garry 2011; Stoljar 2011). Here, I will limit myself to considering
John Corvino’s approach (Corvino 2000), since inasmuch as he wishes to take into
account the ethical dimension of gender-term deployments, his account might super-
ficially be regarded as similar to my own.13
Corvino describes how a collection of properties, such as biological sex, self-
conception, sexual orientation, and feminine or masculine presentation, plausibly
constitute part of our concept of gender without, however, that concept being reduci-
ble to any of them (Corvino 2000, 176). There are no necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for being a woman, but being one involves possessing some determinate number
of the cluster of features, or perhaps a few of the more important features. Corvino
acknowledges that gender thereby is conceived as a “continuous rather than a dis-
crete property” and people can be “more or less” members of gender categories (177).
Family resemblance thus establishes categorical gradability. I will return to this point
shortly. For now, let us note that Corvino distinguishes the conceptual issue of which
gender someone belongs to, from the ethical issue of what people should be called
(179). I understand Corvino to be implying that one might conceivably have a situa-
tion in which Laura, for example, is, conceptually speaking, a “man”—or perhaps “in-
tergendered” (179)—but should, nevertheless, be called a “woman” for ethical
reasons, for example, for the reasons of moral harm and political oppression that I
presented in section 2. So, Corvino seems to be invoking something like a principle
of “moral contestability” like my own. But we can see the substantial difference from
my own position if we apply the counterfactual unacceptability criterion to Corvino’s
gender-term deployments. We could formulate the following gender-term deployment
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for Laura or at least some transgender women: “she is really [insert: the family-
resemblance description, connoted by “man” or “intergendered”], but due to ethical
considerations should be called as if she were [insert: family-resemblance description
connoted by “woman”].”
If broadly implemented within societal use or within law and policy, Laura
would not be seen as “really” a woman. Calling her a “woman” would be merely
a pitying concession to someone who—in the final analysis—has simply got her
gender wrong. This will not likely limit the harms I described earlier, particularly
the undermining of self-respect. Moreover, the implicit idea behind concessionary
gender-term deployment is, ultimately, one of subordination. For in this case, who-
ever thus decides to call Laura a “woman” does not take Laura’s own testimony
seriously. Laura is still potentially subject to hermeneutical injustice, as her
credibility in matters of her own gender is denied. Corvino’s account is thus
unacceptable.14
Suppose, on the other hand, that—in a family-resemblance intensional deploy-
ment—Laura is not excluded, but possesses a resemblance to other members of the
category deemed sufficient for membership in the category woman. She will, on most
family-resemblance accounts—and certainly on Corvino’s account—find herself at
the “margins” of this category: not possessing passing privilege or female sex organs,
her “resemblance” is, arguably, of a rather tenuous kind. Although this type of “only
just” category membership for some transgender women does not logically imply their
social subordination and marginalization, its systematic social and political implemen-
tation would create gender-based hierarchies and would, I claim, tend to produce a
marginalizing effect. Moreover, on a family-resemblance account, Laura plausibly
resembles paradigmatic members of the category man. Such an approach can thus
intensionally deploy the terms “woman” and “man,” so that Laura is called both. But
the deployment of “man” to designate Laura will still have the harmful and oppres-
sive effects I described earlier.15
4. BUT WHO ARE “WOMEN”?
I have focused on gender terms and their deployments. Some readers might find it
strange that I have not touched upon the metaphysical question of whether Laura
is a woman, nor on what it is that makes her a woman. To do so, I would have
to deploy the gender term “woman” in a more specific way than I have done in
this article, invoking intensional or extensional criteria, with the accompanying
danger of excluding or marginalizing at least some people. While not denying the
importance of the metaphysical question, I have chosen, instead, to look at the
harms that gender-term deployments can cause, arguing for Laura’s and others’
moral entitlement to the contestation of certain deployments of “woman.” How-
ever this term is deployed, it is ethically and politically desirable to remain criti-




I would like to thank Natalie Stoljar, Helen Fielding, and Samantha Brennan for com-
ments on earlier versions, and, in particular, Carolyn McLeod and Richard Vernon for
their painstaking and incisive critiques. I also thank Meghan Winsby for giving me the
idea of looking at microaggressions, and participants in a colloquium at Dalhousie Univer-
sity, at which I presented many of the ideas in this article.
1. I write a category in italics, the members of the category in standard script, and
the terms used to denote the members of a category in quotation marks. Thus, a particular
woman is called a “woman” and is a member of the category woman.
2. By marginalization I have in mind any description or characterization of the cate-
gory woman that will situate at least some transgender women as borderline cases, or as
noncentral cases of women with respect to paradigm members of the category woman.
3. I will use “transgender” as an umbrella term encompassing those who in any way
contest, question, or reject the gender label assigned to them at birth. I will sometimes
interchangeably use the term “gender-nonconforming,” or simply “trans.” (It should be
noted that the term trans* is increasingly being used to denote gender-nonconforming
persons who locate themselves beyond binary sex or gender categories [Bettcher 2014]). A
cisgender person is one who generally accepts the gender label assigned to him or her at
birth. Cissexism is based on the (often tacit) assumption that transgender persons should
be subordinated to cisgender persons along some axis, either in a systemic way within
social and political institutions, or on the interpersonal level.
4. I do not deny that possessing so-called “passing privilege” brings certain specific
problems of its own for transgender women, especially if they are not “out” as transgen-
der. I have known some very “passable” transgender women who have struggled with
the tensions of living as if they were assigned the gender label “woman” at birth. They
experience, for example, the constant threat of being “outed,” as well as dilemmas
around getting involved in transgender activism. That said, my position is that, in gen-
eral, passing transgender women—even if they do not hide that they are transgender—
do not experience the misgendering that nonpassing transgender women must put up
with.
5. Of course, I might continue this path toward a marginal standpoint by, for exam-
ple, considering nonpassing transgender women of color. Transgender women of color are
more often victims of physical abuse and discrimination than are white transgender
women (Beemyn and Rankin 2011, 96). I suspect that misgendering is more common and
more malicious in respect to transgender women of color, and probably more often accom-
panied by physical violence and harassment from authorities, such as the police. I do not
accommodate the intersection with race and class in my account. This is certainly a
defect of my approach. My hope is that the perspective I present is sufficiently flexible to
be modified in the light of other axes of oppression.
6. Transgender persons are, of course, also subject to macroaggressions where the lat-
ter are understood as overt—usually physical—aggressions targeting specific groups. In the
case of transgender persons, macroaggressions include rape, murder, and other forms of
physical violence.
7. One could also call it a descriptivist approach (Mallon 2006, 530).
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8. One might compare Sally Haslanger’s distinction between conceptual and descrip-
tive inquiries concerning our gender concepts. A conceptual inquiry will investigate our
concept of gender by examining our intuitions about various actual and hypothetical cases
of what it is to be, for example, a woman, and also by examining definitions or formula-
tions of the concept that we produce upon reflection. The starting point here is the
so-called manifest concept of woman. An inquiry is descriptive if it focuses on the exten-
sion of the concept. It will pick out the various individuals identified as women and
attempt to discover whether the designations track a social kind. The point of arrival of
the investigation is the operative concept of woman (Stoljar 2011, 34–35; Haslanger
2012d, 43). The starting points of these respective inquiries are what I call the intensional
and extensional approaches.
9. Intersexed persons have experienced—and still can experience—heavily invasive
surgeries on the basis of expert opinion, surgeries that have led to serious physical and psy-
chological harms (Karkazis 2008). The intersex movement has campaigned for a halt to
compulsory surgeries as a form of “treatment” of intersexed newborns in cases where life-
threatening conditions are not present. Medical interventions and pathologizing classifica-
tions such as these give us pause for thought about our “deference” to experts, a point I
will expand on presently.
10. The detailed and intense discussions over the reform of the diagnosis within the
World Professional Association for Transgender Health is documented in the International
Journal of Transgenderism 12 (1) (2010), 12(2) (2010), and 13(1) (2011). Some transgen-
der organizations, as well as some psychiatrists, were in favor of removing a diagnostic cat-
egory from the DSM-V altogether. However, doing this would have barred many
transgender people from seeking reimbursement from insurers for hormones and surgeries.
11. The situation is a result of what Saul calls “mixed contexts” where two parties
have different standards of meaning in mind (Saul 2012, 206).
12. Without going into a detailed analysis, I will simply state my conviction that a
similarly critical assessment can be made of Charlotte Witt’s discussion of being a woman
(Witt 2011). Like Alcoff, Witt gives special importance to reproductive function.
13. I thank an anonymous reviewer for challenging me to clarify how my approach
differs from Corvino’s.
14. Bettcher rightly notes that, according to family-resemblance accounts of gender,
transgender women might be best viewed as “women” for pragmatic or political reasons
(Bettcher 2013, 236–38). However, many transgender women’s self-identifying claims
would not be validated.
15. In her own family-resemblance account, Natalie Stoljar explicitly considers the
possibility of gender-category-membership “overlap” (Stoljar 1995, 285). Indeed, the fam-
ily-resemblance approach may be particularly useful to transgender people who are not
harmed or oppressed by gender terms such as “androgynous,” “genderqueer,” or “gender
fluid.” To be fair to Corvino, his account is meant to help explain how someone might
have been a woman at one stage in life, only to become (more of) a man in a later stage
in life (Corvino 2000, 177). Similarly, Jacob Hale promotes his own family-resemblance
account of gender because it most accurately describes the borderline status of “dislocated”
trans genderqueers (Hale 2009, 54–56). Irrespective, however, of the utility of family-
resemblance accounts for describing gender change and borderline gender positions, the
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fact remains that such accounts end up misgendering at least some transgender women
and would be morally contestable if widely implemented.
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